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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
.\ll~RLE

HINDS COMPANY, INC.

Plaintiff,

vs.
TILE INDl"S'l_'lUAL COM~IlSSION
OF F'l1 AU, UNITED STATES FIDELl'rY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, PHILIP M. RALEIGH
COl\lPANY AND HAROLD BA WDEN,

Case No.
10891

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-HAROLD BAWDEN
APPEAL FROM THE
lNDVS'l'RIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a claim before the Industrial Commission of
the State of Utah for disability by reason of an accident
arising out of or in the course of employment.
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
The matter was heard by the Industrial Commission
and referred to a Medical Panel. The Industrial Commission made its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Award on February 16, 1967, which Award was
favorable to Applicant, Harold Bawden.
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RELIEF SOGGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff Merle Hinds, lnc., seeks
Industrial Commission's Award.

rnv\~rnal

of thP

STATEMEN'l' OF FAC'l'S
Defendant, Harold Bawden, disagrees with plaintiff's statement of the facts, in that they are stated a1:1
the appellant contends them to be, not stated, as they
must be on appeal, favorable to the award of the Industrial Conunission.
Harold Bawden was employed by defendant, :Merle
Hinds Company, lnc., as a salesman in September of
1962. (R. 28). His job as a sale:::;man was to solicit ordern
from bakers, candy makers, ice cream makers, clubs and
grocery 8tores. (R. 28-29). He was not furnished a car,
but used his own. (R. 29). He worked on a commission
basis, and was paid $2,984.41, in 19G3, and $3,688.98, in
1964. (R. 33). His average weekly earnings in 1963
were between $69.72 and $78.00. (R. 33). Blue Cross
and Blue Shield insumnce coverage was furnished and
paid for by Merle Hinds Company, lnc., for all of their
employees. (R. 67). Further, United Commercial Travelers' Insurance Company also provided coverage for
all of the employees of Merle Hinds Company, Inc., although the employees paid the premium on these policies.
(R. 71-72). The Company continued to pay the Blue
Cross - Blue Shield premiums for its employees until
July of 1965. (R. 73). l\Ir. Bawden was covered under
both coverages. (R. 71, R. 74).
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Although Mr. Bawden indicated he was not employed to do other things, (R. W), on the day in question, April 30, 19G5, he checked into the warehouse and
was helping driver, Gary Scott, get his load onto the
dock and into his truck. (R. !29).
l\lr. Bawden needed some merchandise to fill an order, and went back into the warehouse to get the merchandise. (R. 30). \Vhile standing in front of the stacked
ca:;es of merdiandi:;e, Mr. Bawden, in checking off his
list of merchandise, gradually a:;:;urned a squatting position. He was bent over very far, with his head protruding quite far to see what was on the label of the
bottom case. While in the bottom position he felt pain
in his knee. (R. 30). He was working in a space somewhat less than three feet wide and demonstrated the
position to the hearing examiner. (R. 31).

He couldn't straighten his leg out, but with the
assi:;tance of a broomstick, a:; a cane, he had the merchandise loaded into hi:; wagon, and made delivery of
the merchandise. (R. 31). Several other employees of
the Merle Hinds Company, Inc., were cognizant of the
fact that Mr. Bawden received the injury. (R. 32-35 ).
l\lr. Sm•dden himself indicates that it occurred exactly
a:; Mr. Bawden testified. (R. 7-!).
Following the delivery of the merchandise, l\Ir. Bawden went to the l\Iemorial Medical Clinic in Salt Lake
City, Utah, and was seen by Dr. '\V allace V. Jenkins on
April 30, 19G5. (R. 34). His right knt>e was x-rayed at
this time. (R. S, top of pagP). l\rr. Bawden was treated
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by Dr. Jenkins and ref erred to Dr. Sam Taylor for
surgery. (R. 34). He was seen by Dr. Taylor on 1\lay
4, 1965, and reported to the L.D.S. Hospital for smg<'l'Y
on May 9, 1965. (R. 35).
Prior to the hospitalization, l\lerle Hinds Compan~·,
Company, Inc., learned that its vVorkmen's Compensation Insurance with U.S.F.&G. inadvertently had not
been renewed on May 1, 1964 and was not in force on
April 30, 1965. (R. 24, R. 37-38, R. 41, R. 69). Mr. Snedden then requested 1\lr. Bawden to re1rnrt the a!'ci<l<'nt
under the Blue Cross - Blue Shield coverage, (R 7-±75 ), which 1\fr. Bawden did. (R. 37-38).
Mr. Bawden was released from the L. D. S. Hospital
on 1\fay 16, 1965. (R. 36). He \Vas re-hospitalized from
May 19, 1965, to July 21, 1965, for complications resulting from the surgery. (R. 164). He was not able to
return to work until June 6, 1966. (R. 162, R. 168).
Mr. Bawden filed a claim with the Industrial Commission on October 21, 1965, against Merle Hinds Company, Inc. (R. 9). Liability was denied by 1\lerle Hinds
Company, Inc., on January 17, 1966, on the basis of no
accident on the premises in the course of employment.
(R. 13). Claim was also made by defendant for coverage
by United States Fidelity and Guaranty for lack of
coverage because of negligence on the part of the insurance agent, Phillip M. Raleigh Company. (R. 13). United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company and Phillip :M.
Raleigh Company were named defendants in the Notice
of Hearing of the claim. (R. 16).
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Hearing was had on l\fay 11, 19G6, at the conclusion
of which, applicant was referred to a medical panel.
(R. 100).
'l'he medical panel filed its report on October 27,
19GG, ( R. 160), and the report was mailed to all parties
and their attorneys on October 27, 1966. No objections
were filed to the report of the panel and the commission
deemed it admitted in evidence.
The hearing examiner filed his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and award which were passed and
approved by the Industrial Commission of Utah on February 16, 1967. (R. 167-168). Defendant Merle Hinds
·Company, Inc., filed a petition for review on March 1,
1967, alleging there was no accident and requesting further hearing, (R. 171-172), which petition was denied by
the Commission on March 16, 1967. (R. 172-A). Defendant filed a second Petition for Review on March 29, 1967,
(R. 173-179) ), raising a new question of an independent
contractor relationship. This was denied by the Commission on April 6, 1967. (R. 180). Merle Hinds Company, Inc., then filed its Petition for a Writ of Review
in this Court on April 12, 1967, (R. 181-186).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND
THAT APPLICANT SUFFERED AN INJURY BY ACCIDENT
ARISING OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.

:Section 35-1--15, U.C.A. 1953, in essence provides:
•'Every ernployee ... who is injured, ... by acci-
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dent arising out of or in the course of his em1Jloyment, wheresoever such injury OC{'lllTed, ... "'hall
be entitled to receive, ... compem;ation for los1:>
sustained on account of such injury."
A hearing was had, after notice, on May 1, 1966,
concerning the occurrence of the accident. Collateral
matters, including vVorkmen's Compensation COVPrage,
or the lack thereof and the reasons why, occupit>d tlw
majority of the time in the hearing.
Harold Bawden testified as to the onset of the
injury on April 30, 1965. That an injury occurred on
April 30, 1965, there can he no doubt. Mr. Snedden himself indicated that the injury occurred t>xactly as Mr.
Bawden testified, (R. 74):
"Mr. Hurley: Now did you learn that l\lr.
Bawden had suffered an injury on April 30, 1965,
did you not?
Mr. Snedden: Yes, sir.
Mr. Hurley: And that lllJury occurred, to
the best of your knowledge, in the manner l\ir.
Bawden has testified?
l\fr. Snedden: Exactly, sir. Yes, sir."
It would appear that the next logical question is
whether or not the injury is the result of an accidPnt
arising out of or in the course of his employml•nt, which
the Commission so found.

The uncontradicted record shows that Mr. Bawden
after having assisted truck driver Gary Scott get merchandise loaded for delivery went back into the ware-
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house of the Hinds' Company to get some merchandise.
Because of the manner in which the merchandise was
:;tacked, the space between the rows of merchandise and
the necessity to see the label on the bottom box, resting
on the floor, .Mr. Bawden assumed a gradual crouching
position as he read down the labels. When he had
a::;smned a crouched position to the limits of his physical
capacity, it was necessary to protrude his head in a
downward manner in a space less than three feet, to
view the bottom label. (R. 30-31). At this point he felt
pain in his knee and he was unable to straighten out
his leg. (R. 31). He hobbled about on one leg for a
while hoping it would straighten out. (R. 32). The leg
did riot and with the aid of a broomstick as a cane, he
was able to move about. His merchandise was loaded on
his wagon by others and he made two deliveries. (R. 32).
The occurrence of the injury on the premises was
known by others, Mr. Smith, 'l'ruck driver Gary Scott,
Salesman Victor Sismonde, and Mrs. Halford, all employees of Merle Hinds Company, Inc. (R. 32). Mr.
Bawden thinks l\Ir. and l\Irs. Snedden were there on
Friday, April 30, 1965, and aware of the injury. Mr.
Snedden instructed him to have the knee looked at.
(R. 33).
Mrs. Halford expressed doubt that Mr. and Mrs.
Snedden were there on Friday, but her memory is admittedly vague. (R. 82). She admits talking to Mr. Bawden on Friday, April 30, 1965, but thinks it was Monday,
May 3, 1965, when he really discussed it. (R. 82). As
to a request to file an accident report Mrs. Halford

8

indicates that she didn't think he requested it, but slw
thought she said she would. (R. 82). She does remember
going down the hall for a file sheet that goes to the
Industrial Commission. (R. 83).
There seems to be no doubt that an injury occurred
as alleged on April 30, 1965. l\Ir. Bawden was seen at
the Memorial Medical Clinic by Dr. Jenkins that day
and their records show that his right knee was x-rayed
and a report of the x-ray was made by E. Paul Isgreen,
1\1. D. (R 8-Top of page).
No issue was raised or concern expressed by anyone until the lack of \Vorkmen's Compensation coverage was discovered. l\Ir. Bawden had reported to
Memorial Medical Clinic that his knee had "slipped out"
at work. (R. 8-Top; R. 3; R. 151). It appears that the
lack of coverage was probably discovered when Memorial
l\Iedical Clinic called Mrs. Halford and wanted to know
who carried Hinds' . Workmen's Compensation. ( R. 80).
Mrs. Halford told her the State Insurance Fund. (R. SO).
When the lady from Memorial l\Iedical Clinic called back
either two or three days or the next day later she informed Mrs. Halford the State Fund had no record of
insurance on Merle Hinds Company, Inc. (R. 80).
With this discovery there were many calls and discussions to find out why there was no coverage. (R. 86).
But, in order to alleviate this difficulty, by the testimony of l\Ir. Snedden (R. 74--75), the relucant testimony
of Mrs. Halford (R. 8G-87), and the testimony of l\lr.
Bawden (R. 37-38), Mr. Ba\\·den was instructed by l\1r.
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Snedden to change the claim to one under Blue Cross Blue Shield, whicl1 he did. Mr. Snedden also made inquiry
of Mrs. Bawden relative to the change of claim to Blue
Cross - Blue Shield. (R. 47). It is submitted that the
reason for any conflicting statements made by Mr. Bawden were at the instigation, direction and control of Mr.
Snedden.
During, and at the close of the hearing, as is set
forth in plaintiff's brief, (P. 4), there were two main
tt>sues:
First: Whether or not there was an accident, and
collaterally the question of medical causation or lack of medical causation. ( R. 45).
Second: The issue of insurance coverage. (R. 100).
Plaintiff also wondered whether or not there was to
be a preliminary hearing on the question of an accident.
lt is submitted that this was the purpose of the hearing
just completed.
Pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-77, U.C.A. 1953,
the medical aspects were ref erred to a medical panel,
(R. 100), appointed by the C01mnission. (R. 156). The
panel, with the addition of an internist (R. 157, 158),
performed its statutory function and made its report
in writing to the Commission October 27, 1966. (R. 160164). Copies of the panel report were mailed by the
Commission to all parties and their attorneys on October
27, 1966, by Certified Mail, return receipt requested,
together with a cover letter notifying all parties they
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had fifteen days within \\·hich to file \Hittc·11 objections
to the report. (R. 165-166).
No objections were filed by any party or attorney.
Pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-11, U.C.A. l!J53:

"If no objections are so filed \\·ithin such lH'l'iod,
the report shall be d<'Pllled adrnittPd in evidmc·<·
and the Commission way base its findin~ and
decision on the report of th<· panel, hut shall not
be bound by such report if there is other substantial conflicting evidPnce in thP cast' whieh
supports a contrary finding by the Commission."
The Comission followed the rnandat<• of tlw statnt<~ and
set forth in its findings: ''The l\ledical Panel Heport
is therefore deemed in evidence'." (H. 161).
In its Findings of Fact, the Commissio11 :ods forth
two issues:
"FINDINGS OF FAcrr:
Two primary and one seeondary iss1w app<•arPd to
be involved in the hearing, namely: ( 1) \YltdliN
or not the Defendant, .Merl0 Hinds Company,
had a policy of workmen's eompensation insurance in effect at the time of the aeeident, April
30, 1965, and (2) 'Yhether or not an acC'ident
occurred in the course of the Applicant's <'lllJ>lo:·ment on this datP, and 8econdarily, what was th<·
medical result if such an accident O('('UlTt>cl." (R.
167).
The Commission then found that tht>re was no "' orkmen's Compensation insuranP<' in effect on the date of
the alleged accident, April 30, 1965. Thl' Commissioll
then found:
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"With resvect to issue number :2, the Hearing
Examiner finds that the Apvlicant, on the date
in question, \ms engaged in activities unusual to
him; i.e., assisting in getting out an order. In so
doing, it required that he crouch low on his
haunches in order to examine a low stocked row
of merchandise. Such an unusual position created
an unusual strain on the knee, which in turn created a split knee cartilage.

It is evident that all employees of the Defendant,
Merle Hinds Company, vvere well aware of its
occurrence and the severe nature of the injury.
The Applicant did not return to work after the
. 30th of April.
Surgery was performed to repair the split knee
cartilage, i.e., meniscectomy. A day and half following his discharge from the hospital, the Applicant became ill, was returnPd to the hospital, and
after a lengthy and stormy hospital stay was finally released." (R. 167).
Plaintiff chooses to ignore the foregoing language,
"Applicant ... was engaged in activities unusu.al to him;
i.e., assisting in getting out an order.... Such an unusiUJ,l
position created a~z unusual strain on the knee, which
m turn created a split knee cartilage." (emphasis ours)
This is the "injury" for which compensation is provided by 35-1-45, U.C.A. 1953.
Plaintiff's argmnent that it must result from an
identifiable accident or accidents in the course of employments raises the correct issue, but fails to define
what is meant by the term, ''accident."
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Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 27G,
382 P.2d 41-± (1963) talks of an accident or aceident8 but
'
does not define the term.
Carling v. Industrial Commission, lG Utah 2d 2GO, 39!:)
P.2d 202 ( 1965) will place the term in its proper perspective wherein at page 202, and 204, it is stated:
"The W ork:men's Compensation Act, Section 35-145, U.C.A. 1953, provides for an award to an
employee" * * * who is injured * * * by accide11t
arising out of or in the course of his employment * * *." There is no further definition of
the term "accident," but this court has held that
for the purpose of the Act it should he given
a broad meaning. It connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from what \Vould
normally be expected to occur in the usual eoun;e
of events."
The principle enun1erated in Carling is not new or novd
to this jurisdiction as is illustrated by the cases cited
in Carling and in particular Graybar Electric Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 73 Utah 568, 276 P. lGl (1929).
Certainly the finding of the Commission above
quoted is on all fours with the definition of an "accident"
without the use of the term. It \Vas the unusual work,
the unusual position creating an unusual strain on the
knee which produced the split knee cartilage, thi8 cPl'tainly was an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur
in the usual course of events. This is the Commission's
finding, not the rnedieal panels'.
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ln the next portion the Commission adopts the medi(·al panel't:> findings as to the medical caut:>ation. Here
the magic word accident appears and Plaintiff would
have this Court believe that the Commission has abrogated its t:>tatutory function. This contention is thoroughly
ant:>wered by this Court in the recent case of Daniel R.
:1lellrn v. /ll(l1tstrial Commission of Utah, et al, decided
August 2-!, 1967, and presently unreported. We quote
the case as follows :
"'rlie plaintiff's main theme is that the Commission adopted the panel report which, it is urged,
was a misstatement of the law. Counsel says:
'The denial of plaintiff's claim by the Medical
Panel is based on incorrect interpretations of law
by the Panel and is contrary to the undisputed
evidence.'
In the first place, the panel did not nor could
not deny the claim, - the function of the Commission.

The other answer to this contention is that in
giving the panel the duty of analyzing this case,
the Commission in a letter appointing the panel
carefully said: "The Panel has no jurisdiction
to make a finding on the occurrence of an accident. Therefore, in the Panel Report just preceding the findings and conclusions, the following
language should be used : 'Assuming but not deciding that applicant had an accident as alleged
the Panel finds, etc.' It is thus obvious that the
Commission, in adopting the report, did not adopt
anv conclusions of law of the Panel if there were
an)r, bnt onl.v the medical facts and conclusions
drawn."
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The Bawden panel was operating under the same
set of instructions. (R. 156). We submit that the Commission properly made its findings of fact and condusions of law and they are am1Jly suprwrted by substantial,
competent, uncontradicted evidence.
POINT II.
HAROLD BAWDEN WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF MERLE
HINDS COMPANY, INC., NOT AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.

This issue has been interjected into this case on
appeal and was never before the Industrial Connnis::;ion.
On March 1, 1967 plaintiff timely filed a Petition for
Review of the Industrial Commission's award in this
case. (R. 171-172). No claim was made at this time that
Harold Bawden was an independent contractor. 'rhe
petition for review was denied by a Commission Order
dated March 16, 1967. (R. 172-A).
On March 29, 1967, plaintiff filed, out of time (See
35-1-82.55 U.C.A. 1953), a second Petition for Review.
(R. 173-179). This was denied by Conunission Order
dated April 6, 1967. (R. 180). This was the first assertion on the part of the plaintiff that Harold Bawden
had been considered anything but an employee of .Merle
Hinds Company, Inc. Plaintiff then timely filed its Petition for a Writ of Review in this court on Aprl 12, 19G7.
(R. 181-185).
Pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Industrial Commission, adopted and approved April 15, 1966,
by Motion 23850, and in effect at the time of the hearing

15

of thil::l matter and based upon recogni11ed principlel::l of
practice, the plaintiff should be precluded from al::lserting
thil::l affirmative defense on appeal.
Although the Industrial Comrnisl::lion rules took effect
after the filing of Harold Bawden'l::l applieation and
Merle Hinds Company, Inc., denial thereof, the applicant
i;.; entitled to some notice of affirmative defenses. Rule
G( e) of the lndul::ltrial Co111111il::lsion in effeet on the date
of the hearing provides :
'' ( c) The ani::\wer must include all affirmative
defenses intended to be used by the insurance
carrier. If such affirmative defense is not included in the airnwer filed, the insurance carrier
will be precluded from using it at the time of the
hearing nnl.ess good cause can be shown as to why
it was not so included. Affirmative def ens es must
be written with sufficient accuracy and detail
that the applicant may be fully informed of the
nature of the defense.''
To permit the raising of this issue on appeal is
unconscionable.
However, it is not conceded that the evidence shows
the existence of an independent contractor relationship.
On the contrary, taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to upholding the award, it is apparent that at
the hearing Merle Hinds Company, Inc., admitted the
existence of the employee-employer relationship.
It would appear that five out of st-ven witnesses were
wlled for the purposp of establishing the existence or
non-existence of a Workmen's Compensation policy. (R

16

20). That Merle Hinds Company, Inc., intended to cover
Harold Bawden as an employee can't be argued. 'l'hl•
injury was going to be reported by Mrs. Halford (R 83),
to the Industrial Commission as an "industrial accident."
The State Insurance Fund was given as the carrier.
(R. 30). No alarm or concern was raised until it became
apparent that there was some doubt as to coverage.
(R. 86). Then the shift to Blue Cross - Blue Shield. (R.
38).
On direct examination James K. Snedden states that
he is the owner and president of Merle Hinds Company,
Inc., operating as a corporation. (R. 67). He was asked
by Mr. Mock: (R. 83).

"Q. l\Ir. Snedden, did your company carry
any Blue Cross - Blue Shield for employees?
A. Yes, we did. Shortly after procuring the
company they had Blue Cross in effect, and I
agreed with my wife - who is a director - to
carry Blue Cross and Blue Shield for our employees, and pay the full amount.
Q. Was the full payment made by Merle
Hinds Company~

A. Yes."
Further questions by .Mr. .Mock to .Mr. Snedden:
(R. 71).

"Q. What other policies do you carry for
your employees, besides the Blue Cross - Blue
Shield~ That is at the time of this incident?
A. That is all, sir. Well, I thought I was
covered with all accidents of all types, and indus-
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trial accidenh;. Because I had been in the past,
I assumed I was at he prl'sent. I was so given the
understanding.

Q. Are you aequainted with a company called
the Utah 'l'ravelers - Let's see. What i;,.; it.
U.T.C.?
A. Cnited Corn11H•reial Travelers Insurance
Company. Ye;,.;, I am. l'm a member, sir.

Q. Does this carry any coverage for any
of your employees?
A. Yes, it does. All our employees are covered under that policy.

Q. Do you recall whether any claims were
filed, on behalf of Mr. Bawden, under that policy?
A. I do. I helped him prepare a claim."
lt dot>;,.; seem somewhat inconsistent to develop a
long line of evidence covering vVorkmen's Compensation
coverage for all employees, Blue Cross - Blue Shield for
all employees, including paying the premium, United
Conmwrcial Travelern Insurance Company for all employees, include Harold Bawden in all insurance that is
in force, then on appeal contend he is an independent
contractor. It must be conceded that l\Ierle Hinds, Inc.,
admitted the employee-employer relationship at hearing
and should now be estopped to deny it.

Some light may be shed upon the intent of l\Ierle
Hinds Company, Inc., by reference to the W'"orkmen's
Compensation Policy issued by lTnited States Fidelity
and Guaranty and inadvertently cancelled. (R. 103). The
policy provides coverage for:
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"Store Risks-Wholesale, or combined wholesale
retail N.O.C.
Salesmen, collector or messengers (R. 103).

Outside."

Which again illustrates the intent of .Merle Hinds
Company, Inc., to provide Workmen's Compensation Insurance coverage for all of its employees. Its presidentowner, at the time of the injury and during the hearing
as well as company's counsel during the hearing categorized Harold Bawden in the class of an employee and
not as an independent contractor.
Taking the evidence as it now stands, it is defendant' Ii
position that the Plaintiff in asserting an affirmative
defense has the burden of proof on the issue and the
evidence will not sustain a finding that Mr. Bawden was
an independent contractor.

In support of the Plaintiff's contention, the court's
attention is directed to Stover Bedding Co. v. bulustrial
Commission, 99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 1027, where this question was timely raised, evidence was thoroughly adduced
at commission hearing and this court held that the applicant was an independent contractor.
Plaintiff points to some similarities between Mr.
Bawden's employment and that of Mr. Knudson, the
deceased applicant in Stover.
1. Both were commission salesmen.
2. Both solicited orders on there own initiative
and discretion.
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::l. I ~oth used their own automobile for which

they were not compensated. (Plaintiff's Brief
- p. 3).

Defendants submit that the record will only support
that Mr. Bawdm became an employee of Merle Hinds
Company, Inc., in September, 1965. (R. 28). That he
\ms hin·d as a salesman, to solicit orders from the trade
for .Merle Hinds which is a distributor of food products
generally. (R. 28).
As a salesman he solicited orders from bakers, candy
makers, ice cream makers, clubs and grocery stores.
(R 28-29). He was not furnished a car and used his
own. (R. 29). He made deliveries, (R. 33) and was
employed as an outside salesman on a commission basis.
(R. 38).
The record is silent as to:
1. Use of own initiative and at his own discre-

tion.
2. Whether he was compensated for the use
of his automobile.
In citing the excerpt from Stover Bedding case as
precedent for this case plaintiff glosses over the fact that
there is no evidence as to: (Plaintiff's Brief - P. 5).
1.. Written Contract,

2. Limits of Territory,
3. Instructions as to conduct of work,
4. Payment of expenses,
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5. Trips to be made and when he should make
them,
6. Control or right to control.
Hence, it would appear that any person employed
as an outside salesman who uses his own car is an independent contractor.
Also glossed over by reference to the Stover Bedding
case is the fact that:
1. Knudson, the deceased, was a salesman for
Stover Bedding Co., and Smith and Davis
Company simultaneously.
2. The accident occurred on a sales trip in

Idaho and not on the employer's premises.
3. The only work deceased did at the factory
was in relation to sales promotion and here
the injury occurred in the course of filling
a merchandise order which Bawden deliv-

erecl.

Without belaboring the point further, it is submitted
there isn't sufficient evidence to support the affirmative
defense of independent contractor. Particularly in view
of the state of the record where it is so obvious that
during the hearing Plaintiff, by its president-owner by
answer and counsel, by the form of question, 'vere treating Harold Bawden as an employee and hoping to escape
liability by showing that the injury did not occur as the
result of a "definable accident."
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'l'his court in Christean, et al, v. Industrial Co1nmissiu11, ct al, 113 Utah -151 l9G P.:2d 50:2, (19-18) approved
the variom; tests for determining the relaionship of
servant and independent contractor as are set forth in
the Hestatement of Agency, Par. 2:20, page 483. The
court again approves the various tests set forth in the
Restatement of Agency in Larry Nicholson v. Industrial
Commission, ct al, 1-1 Utah 2d 3, 376 P.2d 38G, (1962).
Both of these <"ases were presl•nted to the Industrial
Commission and this court on the issue of independent
contractor relationship. Both of these cases involved
written contracts of employment and although the results reached in each case were different, the conunission
and the court were afforded the opportunity of applying
the law to the facts.
In the case of Sutton v. hidu.strial Commission of
[,'tah, 9 Utah 2d 399, 34-1 P.2d 538, (1959) this court
reviewed a case in which the defense of independent contractor was raised, not based upon a written agreement.
Again the issue was asserted in the commission hearing
and the court summarized the problem at pages 539, 540,
as follows:

''The distinction beween the relationship of employer - emploype in which the employee has
various advantages, including workmen's compensation, as contrasted with the independent contractor status, in which lw does not have those
advantages, has been a constant subject of controversv and has been dt>alt with in numerous
cases b.y this court. The conditions of employment ar·e so various that it has proved difficult to
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formulate a definition setting forth specific factors which will invariably apply as an exclu::;ive
definition of the employer-employee relationship
as distinguished from the status of indqJendent
contractor. Generally spe.aking, an employee i"
one who is hired and paid at a given rate to do
work that is part of the trade or business of the
employer, and is subject to constant supe1-i-ision
and contrnl in performing his duties; u·hereas the
independent contractor is engaged to do a particular job or piece of work for ·a set sum and is nut
sUbject for its completion." (Emphasis ours)
We submit that present record supports only the
finding of a normal employer-employee arrangement for
the following reasons :
1. The clear intent of the l\ferle Hinds Company, Inc., as expressed by the conduct of
its president-owner, l\fr. Snedden in setting
up his insurance coverage in three areas was
to cover all employees and it was his intent
to cover l\fr. Bawden as an employee.

2. The testimony adduced at the hearing, including the use of the word employee, by
counsel for the plaintiff, defendant, :Mr. Bawden and Mr. Snedden is only compatible
with the proposition that all of the parties
and their counsel were treating the arrangement as that of employer and employee.
3. That the lack of testimony relating to right
of control, distinct occupation or business,
kind of occupation, ie., specialist or gen-
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eralist, ;-;kill, tools and place of work, length
of time, metl10<l of payment, part of the regular business, whether or not the parties believe the relation::;hip is that of master and
servant a::; set forth in the Restatement of
Agency, ~:2:20, page ±80 and the decisions
of this court, i::; due to the fact that there
wa::; nu issue on this point and all parties
an<l their counsel heliend the relationship
was that of master and servant.

±. That the burden of asserting and proving

the affirmative defense of an independent
contrac·tor relationship is on the Plaintiff
.Jfrrle Hincls Company, lne., which it failed

to do.

5. That on the record the Industrial Commission could only conclude that the relationship \ms that of employer and employee.
POIXT III.
THE IXDl:STRIAL Co:JL\IISSIOX APPLIED THE SA.ME
::'TAXDARD TO THIS XOX-COYERAGE CASE AS THEY
DO TO A COYERAGE CASE.

Plaintiff cites the Industrial Commission case of
foil Jfor ff. Daci!'i c. KC1T, /11c., and the State lnsnr'lilCl Fi111(l. C/.ai111 Xo. Gl-±7 \R. ljj) in support of the
]1rupo:::ition that Harold Bawden did not have an "accid1,nt .. since '"a1iplieant lifted no weight. He did not slip
in fall. The cable incidt>nt required no unusual exertion."
Thl' L"ase fa lb upon its o\nl wording. \Ye direct the
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court's attention to the fact that the Davis incident required no wnusual exertion. The Conunission clearly
found that, Mr. Bawden "was engaged in adivitiPs 1111usual to him; i. e., assising in getting out an order. In
so doing, it required that he crouch low on his haunches
in order to examine a low stocked row of merchandise.
Such unusiwl position created an unusual strain on the
knee which in turn created a split knee cartilage." (R.
167) (Emphasis ours)
We submit that this is an injury by accident arising
out of or in the course of his employment.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the Industrial Commission has not
acted without or in excess of its powers, and that its
findings of fact based upon competent credible evidence
fully support the award and should be sustained and
affinned by this court.
Respectfully submitted,
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